

THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSITION PROJECT

The Moody Series on Bipartisan Leadership

In Conjunction with
The Texas Presidential Libraries

and

In Collaboration With
Rice University's
Baker Institute for Public Policy

Funded by the Moody Foundation

September 23, 2016
At the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library
Austin, Texas

Session Two: PRESIDENTIAL LEARNING AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Moderator Stephen B. Slick, Director, Intelligence Studies Project, University of Texas

John L. Helgerson, historian and former Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency

James Clapper, Director, Office of National Intelligence

John E. McLaughlin, former Acting Director and Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency

For conference video: <http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/experts-news/events/national-security-transition/>

AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION

Diversified Reporting Services, Inc.
(202) 467-9200

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. STEPHEN SLICK: Great, okay. Good morning. Thank you all for coming out. I'm particularly gratified to see so many students, other than the ones I threatened with course credit to attend today. (Laughter.) But anyway, it's nice to see you -- an important topic.

The topic of this discussion is intelligence support to the nominees, the president-elect, and the transition process. I can recall vividly last spring when we were mapping out the agenda for this particular program and thinking what would be important topics to address, I was a persistent advocate that we really need to tell the story that the intelligence professionals play in supporting the transition process. It was little understood. It would be an important educational function we could provide. And most importantly, it was completely uncontroversial, so it would keep us out of those waters.

Well, as the pundits say, nothing about this election is normal, and so I certainly regret -- and I suspect the director does as well -- that the intelligence briefings became a public issue, and we can only hope that they remain quietly and helpfully in the background going forward between now and Election Day.

There's still some more we can accomplish. It's been mentioned in several different previous briefings and the director addressed last night in some detail what's currently underway in terms of intelligence support to the transition, but we're going to bore down with three uniquely qualified experts today.

After I quickly remind you who these three distinguished gentlemen are with me on stage, I'll exercise the chair's prerogative and just ask one quick round of questions, then I want to open them up to your thoughts. They will begin with short four or five-minute observations or presentations.

Quickly, to remind you, from the far end, for those of you who haven't met John Helgerson, a distinguished intelligence professional, CIA analyst, John was previously the deputy director for intelligence, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, CIA's inspector general, where he performed extremely courageously for a period of years after the 9/11 attacks.

But most importantly for today's discussion, John is actually the author of a terrific book on the topic called "Getting to Know the President," which tells the story of intelligence support to the President over the last 50-some years, starting with that famous 1952 invitation from President Truman. And I would recommend, for students or for professors, this book to you. I'm told by John that there will be a new edition coming out as soon as the Obama administration moves on that will also include that 2008 transition between Bush and Obama that we've discussed, and it's a terrific book.

John tells me when you go online at Amazon or Ebay to purchase the book, there'll be several choices. I encourage you to take the \$35 Government Printing Office version and not the \$500 version that somebody's trying to get. I think for \$500 John will come to your home and read this to you. (Laughter.)

You've already met, on John's right, John McLaughlin, of course, former acting director of Central Intelligence, deputy director of Central Intelligence, deputy director of intelligence at CIA, founder of the Sherman Kent School, and on and on. Most significantly for today, to help you understand the context, John's most difficult management challenge in his career, I'm sure he'd admit, was the three years he spent supervising me, trying to keep me from disrupting the national intelligence program too greatly.

And then on our left, of course, is our terrific service Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper, longest-serving officeholder in that position. And Jim did an absolutely terrific job last evening explaining in very direct and practical terms what you and your community are doing to support this transition, and that was very helpful and thank you for being such a great friend of the University of Texas.

So without my further distractions, I think we'll start with John Helgerson, since you're really the master of the history here, and then we'll move to John McLaughlin and let Jim Clapper clean up. Thanks, John.

MR. JOHN HELGERSON: Well, thank you very much, Steve. It's a pleasure to talk with you folks about this, and let me confess up front that my strategy will be to kind of blurt out a number of subjects that we might want to return to. Even with that, I might have to cheat a little bit on the four or five minutes because I want to tell you a little bit about the history between 1952 and Martha then jumped to 2008. A lot of things happened in that period that are kind of useful background as we talk about how intelligence briefings have factored into the transition process.

The reason I happen to be sitting here and happen to have written that book relevant to our story is that when Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, or about to be elected, our then-director Bob Gates turned to me -- I was just finishing four years as deputy director for intelligence -- and he said, "Would you kindly go to Little Rock, find Sandy Berger," who was going to be the national security advisor, "convince those people they want to get a daily briefing with the PDB?"

Well, that wasn't all that long ago, but it's almost laughably amateurish compared to all that goes into this process now. But I went to Little Rock and checked into the Comfort Inn and ended up staying there for three months, but I wasn't going to stay there alone for three months, so I talked John McLaughlin, who worked in the Directorate of Intelligence, handled a lot of the key issues and was an excellent briefer -- so he came along and we spelled one another, every week or 10 days.

But as I prepared to go to Little Rock, I thought, well, I'll look in the CIA files, find out what we've done previously. Because we'd given briefings to candidates and presidents-elect. Well, those of you who have worked in government would not be astonished to find that there was no organized file with a systematic account of all this.

What I found was a few hit-and-miss memos. So I resolved that after I

had completed this time in Little Rock, I would take some period and do a really comprehensive memorandum for the record of what had gone on before, what lessons can we learn from it to make it easier for people who did that process in the future.

Well, that memo turned into the book that Steve is now holding, and in fact you can get it for about 35 cents on the internet if you really want it. But in the meantime, we'll give you a taste of what's in it.

Martha helpfully opened this morning by telling the story of Harry Truman's offer to Stevenson and Eisenhower and how it came to this exchange between Truman -- keep in mind, the President of the United States -- and Eisenhower, the guy who had just recently won World War II, in which Truman was complaining about the screwballs on Eisenhower's staff.

Well, Martha left the story at that, but if you're thinking, as we are, about intelligence briefings, it's worth hearing the rest of the story. Eisenhower, in addition to grousing at Truman, and vice versa, Eisenhower wrote a handwritten note to General Bedell Smith, whom we call "Beetle" Smith, the director of CIA. Wonderful director of CIA. "Beetle" Smith was still in uniform. He had been Eisenhower's chief of staff while they were both in Europe, and Eisenhower was so put out with this whole thing he wrote this note to Smith and he said, "To the political mind, it looked like the outgoing administration was canvassing all its resources in order to support Stevenson's election." Worse yet, Eisenhower wrote to Smith -- keep in mind they worked 20 hours a day, they knew one another intimately.

Here's Eisenhower writing to Smith. He said, or paraphrasing, he wrote to Smith about the importance of doing what is right, and he cited the challenges that he and Smith had faced in Europe during the war. Well, people I interviewed who had worked with "Beetle" Smith said that when he got this note, he was crushed. It was just very disappointing, but he soldiered on with the job.

Now, for purposes of our discussion, it's useful to know that in the end, this came out well. That is to say, while Eisenhower would not accept briefings as a candidate from "Beetle" Smith or go to cabinet briefings on issues abroad, what he was willing to do as a candidate -- he said if you send working-level experts from the CIA, I will be happy to be briefed by them.

Well, they did. The first working-level expert went out to Denver to brief Eisenhower, who was there because it was Mamie Eisenhower's home town, over a weekend. They had a good briefing. Eisenhower said to this briefer, "Well, this is interesting. Come with me." He said, "Mamie and I have to ride in a rodeo this afternoon." So he took the briefer to the rodeo. Well, it turned out there was room in the stage coach only for Eisenhower, Ike and Mamie, so the briefer rode up top shotgun with the driver. (Laughter.)

So the point of this story is if you're going to brief presidential candidates, you never know what's going to happen. But the larger point is going back to where Martha started us, these briefings have the potential to establish either

trust or create a real problem before the -- between the outgoing administration and the incoming candidate administration -- obviously, a lesson from that.

But second, as you saw with poor "Beetle" Smith and the resolution with the working-level briefers, it also has the potential to drag in the intelligence community, and this, too, is a very important lesson.

Now, some of you are already fearful that I'm going to tell you about all the briefings over the years, which I'm not unless you ask. But suffice it to say that there have been 11 transitions, meeting the obligation Steve put on me here. In the 11 transitions since Truman started this process, the victorious candidate in every case has accepted the intelligence briefings and has -- and they have varied from as few as one to as many as a half a dozen or more, no two alike.

Interestingly, there have been three candidates who declined the briefings. Keep in mind, we brief both sides in these elections. The three -- Barry Goldwater declined it; George McGovern declined it, largely for scheduling reasons; and Walter Mondale declined. Well, I won't go into the basis of why, but I think it's pretty clear, frankly, looking back that none of those candidates really thought they were going to end up as president, if you remember who they were running against, and it just didn't seem appropriate to take all the time to go through the process.

But over the years, I think the process has matured and has worked much better. Initially, it was a quick, periodic briefing. Then it progressed to the point where, particularly after the election, the candidates didn't get just a period briefing, they got a daily publication along with an expert to help brief them.

Now, let me just tick off literally a half a dozen or so lessons learned from this, and then we'll come back and talk about any of them if you like.

The first lesson seemingly -- I mean, it's self-evident but surprisingly hard to keep in mind -- is that all of these people are different. They have different work habits. Some like to talk about the subjects. Some like to just read uninterrupted. The scheduling -- have all kinds of different approaches. No person elected president is going to change their work habits because an intelligence briefer shows up, so we've got to play by their rules to make it work.

Second, keep in mind that the vice president is very important. This, too, seems like an odd "lessons learned" when you think of Joe Biden or Dick Cheney, some of our recent vice presidents who were so terribly capable and involved. But earlier on, the vice president was frequently out of the picture.

I believe General Clapper mentioned last night the Johnson case and the PICL that Kennedy read, President's Intelligence Check List. Well, the real reason that Johnson had not -- did not read this was that the Kennedy team -- politics, mind you; the two camps had never been very close but had to marry up. The Kennedy team did not permit Johnson to have the PICL when he was vice president. So when he became president, he was not automatically going to throw himself into reading this thing. And so CIA very quickly regrouped and came up with what, as General Clapper said, became the President's Daily Brief. This was

something new and therefore acceptable to Johnson, and he read it.

A third lesson: the staff is very important beyond the vice president. Now, there are a variety of examples of this, but an extreme case: When Nixon was elected president, he got only one briefing, and for reasons we can go into later, he didn't much like intelligence or the CIA. He accepted no briefings after he was elected, but his national security advisor-designate was Henry Kissinger, and so Dick Helms, our director, created a system where we supported Kissinger perhaps better than we'd ever supported anybody in this process, and it really played dividends once -- paid dividends once Kissinger was in office.

Kissinger was not one to praise others unnecessarily. But I can't resist reading you one quote from his book called "The White House Years," and I think this -- his conclusions here derive in large part from the way Dick Helms started the whole process in the transition. Kissinger wrote about Helms -- he said, "It is to the director that the assistant," meaning himself, "first turns to learn the facts in a crisis and for analysis of events, and since decisions turn on the perception of the consequences of actions, the intelligence assessment can almost amount to a policy recommendation."

Then concerning Helms personally, he said, "Disciplined, meticulously fair and discreet, Helms performed his duties with a total objectivity essential to an effective intelligence service. I never knew him to misuse his intelligence or his power. He never forgot that his integrity guaranteed his effectiveness. His best weapon with presidents was a reputation for reliability."

Well, this is why Helms was the best over the years at keeping the facts of intelligence and the analysis separate from policy, and that's what led Director Jim Clapper last night to answer that one question by saying, "That's a policy one," and he was right: that's exactly what a wise director does.

Now, a couple other lessons learned, quickly. One is the level of a briefer and the nature of the briefer is very important. Eisenhower wanted only a working-level briefer. Not so much later, our director Allen Dulles made a terrible mistake. When Kennedy was running and elected, Allen Dulles said, "I will handle personally all matters related to the transition and the new president."

Well, this, in a word, just didn't work. I'm glad it's an historical example and the principals are no longer with us, but frankly, it didn't work largely because Allen Dulles was of a different generation -- he dressed differently, he acted differently, despite their shared New England background. He just didn't hit it off with John Kennedy, and we can come back to the ramifications of that. But the lesson clearly is you don't want it politicized, and there, too, Director Clapper has shown we learned the lessons of that; he has not permitted anybody at the political appointee level to get involved in the process. Very wise.

Another lesson I would point out to you -- we're almost at the end of this list -- watch the debates. Next -- the first one, of course, is next Monday night. Intelligence issues unfortunately get entangled in these debates, and the intelligence

community has to watch very carefully. The first case was in 1960 when Richard Nixon thought he had lost the debate and the election because Kennedy cited so many intelligence estimates on the state of the Soviet economy and the so-called bomber and missile gaps to the discredit of the Eisenhower administration.

But let me just ahead rather than take much time and say this issue has not gone away. I mean, this was a Nixon prejudice then that complicated the relationship for years, and one reason he didn't accept briefings. But just to remind you, as recently as 2004, the big issue was weapons of mass destruction. The intelligence community was in the unfortunate position where both George W. Bush and John Kerry, the two candidates, were agreed on one thing: their criticism of the intelligence community for its handling of weapons of mass destruction. 2008, the issue was rendition, detention and interrogation of terrorist suspects. Both candidates, Obama and McCain, were critical of intelligence. 2012, the issue was Benghazi; do I need to say more?

So the point is some of these issues stay with us forever, and we need to be sure to keep politics out of the debate, and we certainly try our best. By and large, we succeed, but we have to stay vigilant.

And then one final thing and a couple of words: The intelligence community has to think very carefully about how to introduce presidents-elect and new presidents to covert action programs, sensitive DOD programs, sensitive NSA programs specifically. Almost laughably, the way we handled this in the Clinton turnover is that when I would be briefing Bill Clinton, and I think John did the same, if we came upon an item in the PDB where there was, say, a covert action related to that development, we would say, "Mr. President-elect, you might want to know that kind of behind this story, CIA or NSA or whatever, we're doing or collecting such and such," and we used the occasion of the subject arising naturally to explain briefly what a program was about so that he could make sense of the whole story.

As the years have gone along, the tendency has been to provide more organized, complete briefings before inauguration, but there are still those who argue covert actions and other sensitive ops are better left to after the inauguration. I'll leave it to Jim Clapper to complete that and other stories when his time comes.

Anyway, Steve, I've cheated a little bit but I hope this background might be useful to the discussion that follows.

MR. SLICK: Thanks, John. Time well spent.

MR. HELGERSON: Thanks.

MR. SLICK: John McLaughlin.

MR. JOHN MCLAUGHLIN: Well, John Helgerson has really given you the full story here, and so I think when you reach me you're kind of in anecdote and war-story mode in terms of what actually happened.

Let me tell you my database first. I have been a briefer of candidates, of a president-elect, and then of presidents. Three candidates: I briefed candidate Bush in 2000; candidate Kerry in 2004 and candidate Edwards in 2004 and of course,

as John just mentioned, he and I were sharing the duty with then-President-elect Clinton down in Little Rock, which was a remarkable experience, and I'll come back to that.

And then of course, it's really not something for today unless you want to ask questions about it, but I've also been a briefer of Bush 41 after election and Bush 43 and President Clinton as well, after they were presidents.

So going into the candidate phase here, one of the things that Steve asked me to address is what can you tell these candidates and do you ever get -- and Steve Hadley alluded to this in answering a couple of questions -- do you ever get in a difficult spot where you're having to talk about something that's maybe too sensitive for a candidate, or they're raising a question about the current administration's policy and how do you deal with that?

Well, this happens. All of this happens. Let me take the sensitive question first -- that is, how far can you go with a candidate?

My -- well, let me back up and say at the end of the day, you can get guidance from the sitting administration about how to deal with a candidate, but once you get in the room with someone like, let's say, candidate Bush down in Crawford, Texas for four hours, you got to use your own judgment. Guidance is helpful, and also your preparation becomes academic in a way. I remember I went into that briefing with candidate Bush with a big, thick briefing book, and I'd practiced and I'd learned my brief, and I had it all planned out to turn the pages and say, "Now let's turn to the Balkans," and, "Now we're going to talk to you about terrorism."

After about 10 minutes, I put the briefing book aside and it turned into a conversation, and I would say a very interactive conversation in which he just peppered us with questions. I had two people with me: one person on China, because I felt that was extraordinarily important and we needed to go deep on it; and I took a person who had spent their career working on terrorism, because coming out of the Clinton administration, which those who were there will remember, was really - Sandy Berger had us writing a memo every single day, maybe not on Sunday, about al-Qaida. The Clinton administration was very focused on terrorism, so we felt Bush needed to know that.

Okay. What kind of guidance did I get going into that meeting with candidate Bush? I think it's in John's book, and I -- we will be a little indiscreet maybe in some of the things we say, but Sandy Berger, who was a wonderful -- I want -- the late Sandy Berger was a wonderful and a wonderful national security advisor in my personal experience with him -- frequent phone calls -- and could be a tough boss, but a person of great integrity who really worked as hard as any person I've ever seen.

In any event, I called Sandy before I went to brief candidate Bush and I said, "Do you have any guidance?" And his guidance was, well, help him understand what's going on but don't tell him anything too sensitive. Hmm, what does that mean? He didn't tell me what that meant. (Laughter.)

But now, this whole process is sort of set in stone, but frankly, earlier, and I think even in the Clinton administration days, we were feeling our way on a lot of these issues. So my approach to that was twofold to say, okay, I'm not with a candidate going to go into covert action programs; on the other hand, with a candidate, this person just might end up being president, and so there's a certain point where you get pretty close to the line.

I think with candidate Bush, for example, he was extraordinarily interested in Russia, and I will tell you I went pretty far into Russia in a way that I can't do here because, again, you're sitting there looking at this person and you're thinking, within a couple months this could be the most powerful person in the world. So again, you sort of fall back on your own judgment.

In briefing President-elect Clinton, by the way, similar experiences in that it won't surprise you to know that our experience with then -- well, President-elect Clinton -- was that he was an extraordinarily active mind, reading books all the time, peppering us with questions, very interactive. A couple of observations came out of it, one related to something that came up in the last session.

President Bush had sent -- I think, if my memory serves, President Bush 41 had sent about 20,000 troops into Somalia -- do you recall that? -- on basically a humanitarian mission. That morning, President-elect Clinton was out for his morning run -- did that most mornings -- came back and had the briefing after the morning run, and he ripped me apart. Why? Because after the run, typically he had a little press gaggle, answered some questions, and the press pummeled him with questions about Somalia, and we had not told him about this. Why? We, the briefers, down in this Comfort Inn in Little Rock, Arkansas, considerably before today's technology -- although that wasn't the problem -- we didn't know about it. Why? Because that had been decided in the Situation Room in a meeting among principals, and it was closely held within the Bush 41 administration.

But clearly, President Clinton was going to inherit whatever President Bush 41 had set in motion, and lesson learned. So I said to him, "Apologies." We sometimes called him Governor Clinton at that point because president-elect got too hard. "Apologies, Governor. We'll get back to you with the story on that."

So I immediately got on the closest thing we had to a secure phone and talked to someone I knew who had been in the meeting, got the full story, went back, got on his calendar, and laid it out for him. But the lesson learned was, then, we, as briefers, had to be very connected to the policy process in the current administration and to remember that maybe part of our job here was not just to present the intelligence, but to at least let him know -- we couldn't comment on policy, but to let him know that something -- here's what's going to happen according to our intelligence people who are in the policy process; or as those people to have their counterparts call the president-elect or his advisors and let them know. But you can see the problem that we discovered and that we sought to fix.

The other thing that popped up, and John and I talked about this a

number of times, is that the serving president is, of course, a mature president who -- President Bush 41 had been in office four years, had been through the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. All of that was happening. He knew these issues inside and out, had to live them, and so forth. President Clinton, very smart about all these issues, but as someone observed earlier -- I think Steve Hadley -- no one really knows what it's like to be president until you're president.

In fact, I remember once sitting in Little Rock -- by the way, you get to at times get kind of personal, you have a personal relationship with these candidates when you see them every day. I'm sure Director Clapper has had this experience. And at one point President-elect Clinton -- I was sitting there with Nancy Soderberg, who was, I think, maybe number three in the NSC staff after the inauguration. Nancy was down there as the kind of future NSC rep and advisor with President-elect Clinton, and the president-elect turned to us and said -- just out of the blue he said, "You know, it's a little hard to realize that in three days I'm going to raise my hand and be president." You could see the weight of this, the reality of it dawning on a president-elect.

Another example from the Kerry briefing of this same phenomenon of how you deal with ongoing issues. So as John alluded, at the time of the Kerry briefing in 2004 -- and by the way, all of these -- people have -- candidates have different tolerances for this and different lengths of time they want to spend on it. As I mentioned, President Bush 43 had a four-hour -- one-hour -- one four-hour briefing in Crawford, Texas. John Kerry had two that I was involved in, and one of my colleagues says she did one, too, and you meet them on the road. I met him in Louisville, Kentucky, and then at his home in Boston.

And before the first briefing we did, we had eight pages of questions from candidate Kerry. These were very professional questions. The briefings were very professional. He had one person with him. And by the way, that's another issue that arises: who can come to these briefings? Who can sit there with them?

I'll give you an example of some of the issues that arise. Is Josh Bolten here yet?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: He lands in about an hour.

MR. MC LAUGHLIN: Josh isn't here yet, so I can be indiscreet. But the sitting administration, the Clinton administration asked, well, who's going to be with candidate Bush? And it turned out that the two people we knew were Condi Rice, as an advisor, and I think Paul Wolfowitz was there. I have to refresh my memory; I think Josh Bolten was there. But the question arose about whether -- should Josh Bolten be there? Because he's a domestic policy guy at that point in the -- was intended to be at the early part of the Bush administration. He later became chief of staff. And we had that discussion.

And my input -- and I think it prevailed, if I recall correctly -- was to say, look, I've done a few of these, and if this person might be president and if this person has great trust in this individual and is going to rely on them -- and I happen

to know a little bit about Josh Bolten and realized this was a supremely decent and discreet person -- I said that person ought to be there. In other words, personal view was always to lean in the direction of within reason, not having 20 people in the room, but within reason having enough people there who the president-elect trusted or the candidate trusted.

Anyway, during the Kerry briefing, one -- the only time that I wouldn't say politics intruded -- in a way it did. Politics was in the room. The briefing we did in Boston, of course, we covered Iraq every time but he said, "Bring me up to date on Iraq." And then he stopped for a minute and said, "And let me add, I want you to tell me precisely, exactly what you tell President Bush." Okay, fair enough, and we did. That's the contract. I mean, again, your job is to do exactly that, so it wasn't -- he wasn't challenging us or questioning our integrity or anything, but I think he was saying don't tailor this to me. Fair enough, and we didn't, because we were telling President Bush some pretty unpleasant things about Iraq at that point, as was our job.

What more can I tell you? Maybe I should stop there. And let me just see, there are one or two other points I wanted to make. Well, John said something about staff. Let me just elaborate a bit on that. Two things maybe.

President-elects are surrounded by staff and you have to realize that some of them are going to be as responsible for issues almost as the president-elect, and so you want to help serve them as well, and that was something we tried to do in Little Rock. That was an extraordinarily different kind of thing because we were stationed there in this Comfort Inn that we'd turned into a well-hidden operation center. The press never discovered we were there, astonishingly. They might have heard that the president was getting briefings, but we drove in unmarked cars to the mansion every morning, and Comfort Inn -- who would stay at the Comfort Inn? It's just not a CIA-type of thing, you know? Wouldn't we be at the Ritz Carlton, or there was one very popular and historic hotel downtown. No, we were out at the airport, ate every morning at -- what was that place? It was Denny's or something. No, it was the Waffle House. We took over the Waffle House for three months. I still haven't recovered. (Laughter.)

But I ended up in the time I was there, and I suspect John did too --

MR. HELGERSON: Liked waffles.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Liked waffles, but we had vehicles, so the staff was short, so I ended up driving future cabinet officers from the airport in to see the president-elect. Madeleine Albright came and there was no one to pick her up, so I said, well, I'll do that, and we drove out to the airport and I brought her and her two daughters in to meet the president-elect, and with other -- I think several uniformed officers who came down as well.

One other point about those briefings which I know is in John's book. At some point, we realized that maybe after the Somalia incident that the president-elect was asking a lot of questions that President Bush wouldn't necessarily ask. So in addition to giving the president-elect the very book of briefings that President Bush

got, we started doing our own supplement for President-elect Clinton, and we would sit down every night. And by the way, you didn't get much sleep down there. But we'd just sit down every night and we'd do maybe one page of two-sentence bullets on the issues that he -- we knew him to be interested in.

For example, he was very interested in Israel and what was going on in the Palestinian-Israeli dimension, in ways that Bush 41 was not at that moment focused on. So we would do a little update supplement for him.

You get rather -- you see a personal side of candidates that -- I remember once that President-elect Clinton had an economic summit in Little Rock, had advisors coming in. I happened to be walking into the mansion at that time, and he was dressed for this session which was going to begin in about an hour, and he was standing in a little room off to the side of the room we used for briefing, and he was talking to himself in the mirror. And what he was doing was rehearsing what he was going to say that morning, and he happened to see me come by and just sort of winked in the mirror. You just see little glimpses of their humanity that you typically don't see, and which I probably shouldn't talk more about.

So I think I'll stop there. One or two other things, but they'll come out in questions, and I turn to the director.

MR. SLICK: All right. Thank you, John. Director Clapper, thanks very much. Last night, that was a great laydown of how this is functioning at present. What would you add to that?

MR. JAMES CLAPPER: Well, I thought -- Steve, thanks. I would just, as you indicated, and I'm often doing this -- cleanup here. So I just thought I'd key off some things that John and John said in the context of the current transition. And by the way, because of that I can't be quite as forthcoming about the details of what is still an ongoing process.

John Helgerson mentioned about adjusting to different styles, and that's clearly true both with candidates as well as presidents. And President Obama's style of receiving intelligence is quite different than President Bush's was, and we just have to adjust to that. One major difference, of course, with President Obama: he now gets a PDB on an iPad, so we don't do hard copy any longer, which was a very traumatic change, not so much for the President but for those around him. But it works very well and President Obama is very IT-literate.

So we no longer -- when we go in the Oval, and I share this duty, we don't brief the PDB; we add or supplement either two things that are in the PDB or update it in the time that -- from the cutoff of the PDB, when it has to be put to bed, until we actually walk in the Oval. So that applies certainly to presidents as it does to candidates.

Remember the vice president was one of John's lessons, and we do. They're included now as a part of the briefing process, and we have briefed both of the vice presidential candidates. Staff -- the rule is two designees, and they have to be cleared appropriately for access to the classified briefings.

On the issue of covert action or any other sense of such issues, those are not treated -- at least we're not for candidate briefings, but I believe my plan at least, and of course I'll have to work this with the White House, but my plan is to take advantage of that 74 days between Election Day and Inauguration Day. And when we get access to the president-elect, our basic objective, or certainly mine, is to do our best to prepare the president, whoever it is, for taking on a very, very daunting set of responsibilities, and the more we can educate beforehand, I think, the better.

Covert action is very unique, and this is one case where I -- although our candidate briefings and our subs of intelligence briefings are now IC, they're IC teams, not exclusively CIA, covert action will be because that is a unique function and a unique relationship with the president. Those programs are the president's own, and so I think the president-elect should be aware of the current status of those programs.

Another point John McLaughlin made, which I think is very important, and that is consistency of what we brief, and that is something we've tried to stick to, adhere to in our current process. That's our story, we're sticking to it, regardless of who it is we're briefing.

One -- Steve alluded to the -- how much attention has been paid to this process, more so than I think at any time in history, and one of the issues that arose, of course, was clearance, the clearance status of either candidate. I got a letter from the Speaker of the House enjoining me not to brief Secretary Clinton, and I had many internal cards and letters from people enjoining me not to brief Mr. Trump. And the fact is that that is not my call or not an administration's call. Once the candidates are anointed by their respective party, that is the basis for their clearance or their access to these briefings.

So the way I think about it, this is a process the electorate is carrying out, and hopefully in November they will pick one candidate on time who will then be given access to all the secrets there are, and that's not something that I or anyone in the administration makes a judgment about. There's never been a stipulation or a requirement for a clearance or suitability determination. We don't do that.

Finally, I want to -- this is, for me, fascinating history and lessons that we've tried to apply from those who have gone before us, and that's -- we've certainly capitalized on the icons that you've heard speak already who've gone through this and we've tried to take advantage of that.

I would commend to you -- I'm not getting a commission for this -- the book written by Jim Steinberg and Kurt Campbell called "Difficult Transitions." I started reading that last night and this morning, and it already resonates with what I'm seeing in this transition.

So I will stop there and yield back the balance of my time, as they say on the Hill.

MR. SLICK: Thank you, Mr. Director. I'm watching the clock. I want to make sure we have time for questions, so I'm going to go a little bit off script here.

We have canned questions for each of you, but I'm going to put those away and just try something, try an experiment here.

So if I ever had any good ideas -- and that's highly dubious -- they would have been ideas that I stole from John McLaughlin or Steve Hadley, for obvious reasons that you've become aware of. And so here's one in that vein.

So we've talked about preparing the nominees, the president-elect and ultimately the president as an individual. Steve and John have both frequently commented about how difficult and challenging it is to be an effective consumer of intelligence, that this is not something that's instinctive or that's natural to any of us, particularly politicians. So how do you learn? How do you task? How do you take advantage of these fantastic resources that are available in our sixty billion-plus dollar intelligence community? And it's much harder than any of us think.

So whether you wish to attack that from preparing the president his or herself to be a better consumer while you're introducing yourself to them, and how to help them get the most out of what you know and what you can bring to bear; but more importantly, the rest of the administration, and this was a point Steve Hadley made frequently to me. Why doesn't the intelligence community have a course, have a training session, have a two-day offsite where you teach assistant secretaries and under secretaries what these pieces of paper are and what kinds of questions they can ask and what are other people seeing while I'm talking to you and reading this?

So anyway, with that, Jim, would you like to start?

MR. CLAPPER: Well, first of all, we have built such a course. That was at the request of the current NSC, and it's a good idea. So we have an intel 101 course that we intend to use after the election for NSC staff or those who are in the wings to be key positions.

Senior policymakers in the government, of course, are assigned their own PDB briefer, who is the entrée, if you will, into the rest of the IC for responding to questions. I think one of the first things we'll do is to lay out what's called the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, which is the large framework, the amalgam of all the requirements that are levied on the intelligence community currently by all parts of the government, to include the Defense Department, the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, et cetera.

And all those requirements are synthesized into what's called the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. This actually existed before the Obama administration and has been sustained in it and refined. And the top tier of that are the president's intelligence priorities, which are a fairly small list. And so I would think that would be the logical point of departure to start with: Well, here is what the current list of priorities are which drive what the intelligence community does.

MR. SLICK: Terrific. John, do you have a thought on that?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yeah, it's a really interesting question.

Someone gets elected president and overnight they go from the spin room to the emergency room. Because they're -- they've been in a campaign where much of what

is said is said to win opinion. Well, in walk these people who don't have opinions, or if they do, they're professionally mandated to keep them to themselves, and they're kind of laying things out in this clinical way about what's going on in the world. So that's a bit of an adjustment, but if someone's been elected president, they adjust pretty quickly to everything.

New presidents and their staffs come to this meeting, this juncture with varying levels of experience. It's not a political statement to say that should Secretary Clinton be elected, she'll know this will all be familiar to her and for most people who work with her, they will have had some experience, I'm going to guess, at dealing with this intelligence beast and probably won't take -- need a lot of instruction. If the other person is elected, we'll have a very different situation, to put it diplomatically.

So what are the things you want to impart to them? Well, you have to first figure out what are they -- what's their going-in view of intelligence? And sometimes the very issues in the campaign will have given them the impression that intelligence is not very good. Or sometimes they'll have the view that intelligence knows everything when, in fact, it doesn't. So you're trying to in that early period bring them -- thinking of the president-elect and candidates -- to an understanding of what you can do and what you can't do.

A very good definition of intelligence came from Brent Scowcroft -- it's one I always cite to people -- who said that the role of intelligence is to narrow the range of uncertainty when very difficult decisions have to be made. Notice he didn't say predict the future with absolute clarity. He didn't say don't ever miss anything. I often use a sports analogy of how do you think of intelligence: is it baseball or basketball? If you're a basketball player, you've got to make 90 percent of your foul shots to stay in the game. If you're a baseball player, you can get into the all-star game with a 300 batting average. Well, how difficult is intelligence? Where do you want it to be on that scale? You want it to be over toward the 90 percent end. Sometimes you're not.

So you talk to candidates. An important lesson that came out of the Iraq failure, not to gild the lily, is -- and believe me, Jim, I think, Director Clapper will affirm that the intelligence community really went to school on that bigtime. There's a long list of lessons that have been applied, and one of them is make sure you tell people what you don't know and make sure they understand your level of confidence in what you're saying. So those are things that you try and impart to a candidate.

MR. CLAPPER: There's an old (inaudible) in intelligence -- excuse me, John.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Go ahead. No, go ahead.

MR. CLAPPER: Old (inaudible) intelligence and you learn it the first week in intel school. There are only two conditions in life: there's policy success or intel failure. There's no other condition in life. And to John's point, my fingerprints, in another capacity at the time, but my fingerprints are on the infamous weapons of mass destruction in Iraq national intelligence estimate that was published in October

of 2002. I remember it well. And we have gone to school on what happened in an effort to prevent that.

John makes another important point that -- and another old (inaudible) in intelligence about remembering the difference between mysteries and secrets. I think too often -- and I may sound defensive here, and I'll apologize for that -- but I think too often the intelligence community is held to the same exacting standard for divining both.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: And we're better at secrets than mysteries, yeah.

MR. CLAPPER: Than mysteries.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I'm going to quote Jim Steinberg here on something, too, that's important that you don't necessarily tell the candidate, but you know and you convey it one way or another, or the president-elect. I actually quoted you in an article I wrote in a chapter of a book called "Analyzing Intelligence," where my chapter was "Serving the National Policymaker." And I heard this at a -- Jim say this at a meeting in England, where we're not supposed to say who said what, but -- (laughter) -- I'm violating that.

And correct me if I have it wrong, but Jim said be careful -- make sure that you encourage the policymaker to ask questions, because if you tell them something that affirms their agenda, they won't ask you any questions. So you know, though, that you don't know everything. I mean, the definition of an intelligence analyst is someone who is dealing with ambiguity and information arriving incrementally but under pressure to conclude. That's dangerous territory.

So you have to be clear: if they're not asking you questions, you have to make sure that you say to them, well, look, there are some things we don't know about this and there are some dissenting views. You have to put the questions into the mix.

MR. HELGERSON: If I may, going back to Steve's original question, I would add just one kind of factual thing, and that is we really don't, in historical terms, come up very often with circumstances where you've got candidates who don't know anything about this. Depending on how you count, because there were some special conditions, roughly half of those who have run for president have been either a president seeking reelection or a vice president seeking to become president. And then in a substantial proportion of those candidates who are neither president nor vice president, they come from the U.S. Senate or whatever, where they've been cleared for classified information and have a pretty good understanding of what they can reasonably get out of the intelligence community and what they can't.

It's not all that often that you get people who have neither background. Usually they're governors of a state -- a Jimmy Carter, for example, but he was in high-level Navy positions and so on, but once in a while you get a Bill Clinton or a Donald Trump and so on. Brilliant people, usually, but they don't happen to have been in our business. But there are few of them and we've learned to deal with it pretty well, I think.

Now, concerning intelligence being things you really know, I can't resist one additional sentence or two on Somalia. John raised this. It was an important thing. But when we didn't really know all the facts, and Clinton's interest was deep, it was decided to bring the vice chairman of the joint staff to Little Rock and we drove him through the gate and got him there, and this Navy admiral gave a very good and comprehensive briefing about what's all this about in Somalia.

But concerning the particular facts, I can't resist telling you one more thing, and that is one of these days, when Somalia first came on the PDB radar, Clinton was not known for his adherence to schedule. I had nothing to do in Little Rock other than brief him, so I didn't mind. So I was sitting around for an hour or so waiting to see him and reading the CIA fact book on the countries addressed in the book. Well, it paid off because Governor Clinton opened the book, saw the item on Somali, was discouraged to see what it said. He turned to me and he said, "John, what's the population of Somalia anyway?" I had read the fact book. I said, "Governor, it's 17.2 million by last estimate." He said, "No" -- well, he was surprised. Anyway, my thought -- holding the PDB, my thought was to lead up and spike it. I thought this is going to be my best briefing ever.

But the point is you don't often get questions where you happen to know to the decimal point what the estimate is, and even then I told him, "And in fact, the nature of Somali society is such that we don't really know with that precision, but that's a best guess." Now, one of you at least will go back and look it up, or you're already doing it. I don't really remember at this point all these years later whether it was 17.2 or 12.2. But anyway, it was a great and quickly passing victory.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Let me add to what John said about President-elect Clinton's schedule. He was an incredibly curious person about everything we brought in, and these briefings could go on for a long time, particularly if there was something he was interested in. And at one point -- I mean a long time meaning 45 minutes, an hour. At one point his staff came to me and said, "You get out of there in 20 minutes or this is over." I said, "Well, could I stretch it to 30 or so?" They said, "Well, that'll be the max."

Because -- so I raise this because access is a privilege and an issue. I mean, you want to maintain your access but you don't want to abuse the privilege, and meanwhile people are stacking up out there who are going to be interviewed for cabinet jobs, and you're in there talking about Somalia. So we then disciplined ourselves and at a certain point simply said, "Governor, I know that there are a lot of people waiting to see you, and I just have one or two more comments," and we'd try and get out of there within 20 minutes to half an hour.

One other thing related to that -- the access issue. We had this extraordinary access to President-elect Clinton. He was sort of captive there in Little Rock, although John went to see him in --

MR. HELGERSON: Hilton Head.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- Hilton Head and I flew out to Santa Barbara

to see him when he was moving around the country. But that whole question of access is very important, and it's a privilege to have it, and the access you have can be cut off very quickly.

So, for example, I ended up briefing him on Inauguration Day. It's a little personal thing here. First I had to talk my way through the police line around Blair House. So imagine you go up to the police line and you say, "I need to see the president-elect." "Yeah, right, you and everyone else out here." "No, you don't understand, I'm from the CIA." "Yeah, right." "No, no, I have a credential." "Yeah, right." It wasn't easy to get through the police line to get into Blair House.

Eventually I did, and you get in there and it's Inauguration Day -- what a privilege to be in that place at that moment. It's one of the great benefits that come from holding a position like any of these. And there's the swirl of activity, and I think I saw Brent Scowcroft going up the steps with military folks with him and someone said, "He's taking up the nuclear codes." I don't know whether that was true but it felt true. And Sandy Berger and Tony Lake were there, and I hadn't met them; I knew Nancy Soderberg. So I went up and introduced myself, and they said -- and they're both friends of mine and we became quite close. But they said, "I don't think he has time for that today. This is Inauguration Day. He's going to church and then he's going to be sworn in."

He came down the steps and he kind of looked around the room and he saw me standing over in the shadows, and he came over to me and he said, "What have you got for me today?" And I remember it was a day when our message to him was there was something going on with Iraq at that time. It had -- no one was invading or anything; it was just Saddam Hussein was misbehaving in the week or two before that. And I remember recognizing the truth of what Sandy and Tony had said. I said, "Governor, there's" -- "Mr. President-elect, really nothing for you today. I have here" -- I had a piece of sensitive intelligence that said, "Saddam Hussein is giving you the day off." (Laughter.) We had some information that whatever he was thought to be preparing to do, he was not going to do. And I said, "Godspeed, Mr. President-elect," and he disappeared.

I didn't see him for three more years, until I briefed him -- well, he came out to the CIA for a -- do you mind war stories like this? This is just color now. This is not -- this is just color. But we had talked because you spend a lot of time with someone if you're in Little Rock, Arkansas. We had talked -- he'd asked me about my kids and I said, "Oh, my son is getting ready for college and I'm taking him around when I have time." And he said, "Yeah, I'm helping Chelsea with her homework," and we talked about children.

Okay, I don't see him for three years, and he's out at CIA and he's on a rope line because everyone showed up to say hello to him, and I'm sort of in the crowd along the rope line. He goes along, and there must be a million Bill Clinton stories like this, and he reaches over, shakes my hand, and he says, "How is your son?" Wow.

So it's a privilege to have these jobs.

MR. SLICK: All right, thanks. We have a few minutes. I'm looking for a student first, but let's have some questions. How about a former student. Brandon?

MR. ARCHULETA: Hi, gentlemen. I'm Brandon --

MR. SLICK: There's a mic coming to you, Brandon.

MR. ARCHULETA: Brandon Archuleta, West Point. One of the things that I admire about the intelligence community is your steadfast dedication to nonpartisanship and being an apolitical institution. And so I wonder if there's growing concern within the IC as to whether or not the number of op-eds written by former intelligence professionals either endorsing or denouncing candidates in either camp, vocal advocates for and against these candidates, are going to create a corrosive culture within the IC that's going to damage the relationship for future presidents?

MR. CLAPPER: Well, I hope not, and certainly I think people do understand in the intelligence community that when you're serving, on active duty, to use a military phrase, that you're in a different capacity than you are when you're out as a retiree or as a former. And certainly there are Hatch Act provisions and things like that that we remind the workforce about during this season.

But after that, people are free to do and say as they please. And I just think that the difference is if you're in -- serving in a position in the intelligence community, it's a little different than when you're not, and it's not unlike with military officers. I have my own views on military officers getting involved in this, but that's just me. I'll just keep that to myself. But it is much the same thing. I think it's understood when you're in the military that what you -- what is appropriate for you to say and do versus when you're not on active duty and you're in a retired status.

So I don't think, and certainly we'll do what we can to prevent it from being corrosive, to use your words. That's just part of the barrage of information and rhetoric that we're all subjected to just as are the IC workforce, as is the IC workforce.

MR. SLICK: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Ambassador.

QUESTION: Thank you. Good morning. I'm J. Santamira (phonetic). I'm a Houston businessman and former federal official. Of course, 50 percent of the people who are briefed do not become president or vice president. I wonder if there have been instances in which in after times, they have divulged information given to them in a classified setting, and if so, what sanction, if any, has been brought to their attention?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I'm certainly not aware of any. I don't know, John, do you?

MR. SLICK: John, do you have any (inaudible)?

MR. HELGERSON: Well, no particular cases come to mind, certainly where there was any action taken. I mean, frankly, this is a -- this problem that we think of in terms of leaks has been with us for decades. Every director of Central

Intelligence or National Intelligence worries about it. Chairmen of congressional committees worry about it. In all candor, the executive branch leaks; the legislative branch leaks. One tries to keep it to a minimum and keep the leaks to things that are not really critical. But it's a problem that we have never been able to solve given our values about what the First Amendment and others provide.

So in my own judgment, there's been no significant harm done. What there has been done is a few embarrassments along the road. But I don't know of any time that sanctions have been pursued to pursue anyone who leaked information specifically from intelligence briefings as a candidate or president-elect.

MR. SLICK: In the back. Sorry, young lady in the black. Yes, you. Thanks.

MS. BOLSINGER: Diana Bolsinger here, LBJ School. Everything you gentlemen have described just is, A, extremely high-priority -- you need to build a relationship with a new president, new administration; B, extremely work-intensive, not just for your senior gentlemen up dealing with the principal, but tremendous numbers of people back in the agencies doing the research, writing the briefings, preparing the briefing papers, et cetera, et cetera. These same people who are addressing the questions that reach the level that you're briefing are also the same people who are working the most critical accounts -- the terrorism, the Somalia at war, et cetera, et cetera.

What lessons learned do you have on the internal organizational front of how to address the staffing problems, how to address the prioritization, how to manage these intense surges?

MR. SLICK: Mr. Director?

MR. HELGERSON: Sounds like a director question.

MR. SLICK: Resources -- there are only so many experts.

MR. CLAPPER: Well, that's true. There are, and that's what makes the process easier. Because what we look to are the experts who have spent years on the subject matter, and they don't have to spend an inordinate amount of time getting ready for these briefings because they already have the expertise. Now, if you want to count that as a resource investment, going back to when people first come to the intelligence community, but we do try to capitalize on that expertise.

I will tell you that the fact that now these are IC, intelligence community briefings, we have a wider population of people to draw on, so it is not an imposition on just one agency, which it was in the day when CIA exclusively were doing these briefings. So we spread the joy and the pain around much more than previously. And by the way, as I explained last night in my remarks, those who are committed to supporting the candidates are completely separate from those who are preparing today's PDB in support of the President and the White House. It's a completely different group of people.

But again, the fact that we can draw on a much larger population across the entire intelligence community, and so the briefing teams are composed of experts

from around the community, not exclusively CIA.

MR. SLICK: Sir.

MR. HAMILTON: Bill Hamilton, Austin LBJ School alumnus, so I hope I qualify as a former student. If the answer is in a book, just tell me and I'll go find that out. General Eisenhower's attitude toward briefings in 1952 -- what information do we have about his attitude about briefings eight years later? And I guess my point of reference might be my memory is fuzzy about what John Kennedy knew and did not know about planning for the Bay of Pigs.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, that's an interesting question, and certain aspects of it are in the book. But of possible interest to others, if you didn't hear the question, it's what did Eisenhower think eight years later when he was passing the baton.

Well, it is an interesting story because our CIA and community head then, the DCI, was Allen Dulles. And there are two issues for the existing DCI or DNI really to be careful about. One of them is politics of this whole thing; the other is, do I want the job after the election? And frankly, quite a number of directors have wanted to be kept on, and this has created awkwardness. I'll use only historical examples lest we get in trouble with living veterans of all this. We can perhaps take Director Clapper at his word after all he's done that he may really want out of this. So he's kind of a special case.

MR. SLICK: You've solved that problem for us.

MR. HELGERSON: But coming to your question, it was pretty clear to everybody that Allen Dulles would like to stay around. Eisenhower and his associates knew this, and Eisenhower and others -- Sherman Adams, I've forgotten others -- in their memoirs say, "We had to be pretty careful in explaining to Allen," that is Dulles, "what he could discuss with John Kennedy when he was a candidate, not when he was president-elect."

And Allen Dulles, as I mentioned, wanted to handle it all himself, and we have very sketchy information about what he actually told Kennedy, which became a problem. Because he did a couple briefings alone -- one in Hyannis Port, one in Washington, in Georgetown, before the election. Well, in very -- I'll make one more story kind of quick here, I hope.

But to answer your question, very shortly before the election, an item appeared in the newspaper one day, and it had been put there by Richard Goodwin, one of the Kennedy staffers, and it related to Cuba and advocated on Kennedy's behalf that the U.S. should undertake covert action to support those who would challenge Castro in Cuba. Because the larger issue was who lost China, who lost Cuba. The Democrats didn't want to appear weak on this.

Well, we later learned in Goodwin's own book that this was the only press release of the whole campaign that was not approved by the candidate himself. It was given to *The Times* late at night; Kennedy had gone to bed. But the newspaper and others turned on him: "This is the worst mistake of your campaign" they wrote

in *The New York Times*.

Well, frankly, Kennedy tragically was killed, of course, but his staffers and Richard Nixon years later continued to write books and articles back and forth about how much had Kennedy been told, including before the election, about what became the Bay of Pigs operation. But Eisenhower was very nervous about this. Vice President Nixon was apoplectic. Nixon later wrote, "I knew of the planned or the developing covert action before the election, but in the debate I felt I could say nothing, and here Kennedy came across as being the tough guy and I was helpless to say anything." So he, of course, held this against Allen Dulles.

Well, there's another little chapter to this story, and you didn't know what you were getting into. But after the election, Allen Dulles did go with our deputy director for operations, then called plans, Richard Bissell, to Palm Beach, Florida, and they went through in much greater detail what this was all about. In his book called "A Thousand Days," which I think is the best thing written about the Kennedy years, Arthur Schlesinger wrote at a meeting in the White House 12 days after the Palm Beach briefing, Kennedy met with the CIA, heard the latest on the Bay of Pigs plan, and told them to go ahead. I paraphrase a little bit.

Well, interestingly, when I read about this in Schlesinger's book, I thought, why have I never heard of this? Because I was writing my own book. So I went back and looked at director's -- got out of the archives the director's daily schedule and looked in *The Washington Post* to see what he'd been doing that day. There was no mention of a meeting between Kennedy and Allen Dulles. I thought, how can this be?

Well, to make a long story short, it turned out that Arthur Schlesinger had it wrong. He was correct that the president had met with Dulles on this day and told him to go ahead. But coming back to our whole theme of transitions, Arthur Schlesinger had forgotten that on the 29th of November, 1960, the president was not yet John Kennedy, on his mind; the president was still Dwight Eisenhower. So there was a meeting. Dwight Eisenhower told Allen Dulles to go ahead with this.

But the interesting thing is that some of these briefings or non-briefings turn out to be historically important, because if you check out of the library or get online any book on the Bay of Pigs, it will quote Arthur Schlesinger as saying that John Kennedy authorized all this on the 29th of November, 1960, and in fact he didn't. Kennedy didn't even get briefed on it until sometime after he was inaugurated in late January, and even then he didn't say, as Eisenhower did, "go ahead."

So this is a small thing in the larger scheme, but Kennedy's responsibility for all this was much less than is usually portrayed at the earliest stages, and when he did get involved he was in a little more awkward spot. Again, this reflects -- I mean this relates to our discussion of transition. Allen Dulles probably should have briefed him or somebody else representing the White House in detail on the Bay of Pigs thing, but it didn't happen, and it created an awkwardness that has gone on -- went on for years afterward, this exchange over who did what and who

was at fault.

Good question. You had no idea what you were getting into.

(Laughter.)

MR. SLICK: Terrific example of why all this matters so greatly.

MR. HELGERSON: Yeah.

MR. SLICK: Please join me in thanking our panelists. (Applause.)
(Whereupon, the panel discussion was concluded.)

● * * * *